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Software-based platforms have become 
omnipresent both in private and professional contexts. 
Platform owners constantly invest in platform evolution 
in that they update the technological core and enrich its 
feature base. The question arises how such platform 
core feature changes can be compared with third-party 
complements. We investigate this question in the context 
of an exploratory machine-learning based case study on 
Apple’s mobile platform iOS. By analyzing the changes 
to iOS over time and developing an approach using 
natural language processing, we are able identify 
functional overlaps between platform core features and 
complements. Our results suggest that platform core 
features are indeed functionally related to those of 
complementors and that the strategy of releasing novel 
platform core features changes over time. Besides, our 
approach enables us to assign platform core features to 
app categories. The analysis of functional overlaps 
raises relevant implications for research and practice. 
 
1. Introduction  
Platform ecosystems have gained significant 
economic relevance in recent years. In the context of 
software-based platforms, competition has become a 
major topic that materializes not only among platforms 
[1], but increasingly among contributing participants 
within a platform market [1, 2, 3, 4]. For example, 
mobile platforms such as Google Android or Apple iOS 
have seen an unprecedently rapid expansion, now 
offering myriads of third-party applications to users via 
the platform’s marketplace. These applications are 
commonly referred to as complements and are vital to 
the platform’s success [5, 6]. They are provided by 
external developers on the platform’s periphery, which 
evolves around a core-product maintained by the 
platform owner [7, 8]. The platform owner invests 
heavily in updates in order to guarantee the overall 
stability of the platform as a technological foundation 
for complement development. [2, 9]. This highlights the 
established core-periphery argument which indicates 
that a software-based platform consists of a relatively 
stable core and a variable periphery [5]. Yet, besides 
dealing with maintenance and security issues, platform 
owners integrate novel features into the platform core to 
address platform evolution and growth over time [5, 9, 
10]. Frequent complaints suggest that such features may 
have been previously provided by third-party 
complementors, who see their business models severely 
endangered by the platform owner’s decision to enter 
their market space [e.g., 11]. Thus, the introduction of 
platform core features may critically affect the 
complementary market and the complementors’ 
competitive situation. For example, Apple integrated 
several features such as Flashlight or AirDrop, thereby 
making the features available to all users and inherently 
bundling them with the core platform. The introduction 
of novel features by platform owners may benefit users 
due to decreased search costs and increased ease of use, 
yet may have significant impacts on the competitive 
environment and on complementors’ ability to capture 
value. Following, the introduction of platform core 
features appears to exceed a platform owner’s need to 
address maintenance and security issues and may target 
the management and coordination of evolutionary 
dynamics of platforms and ecosystems. Contrary to the 
above-mentioned notion of a relatively stable core, it 
seems that platform owners aim at an evolving platform 
core by constantly enriching its feature base. 
The phenomenon of competition in platform 
markets has received elevated interest in extant 
literature on platform governance [3, 4, 12]. Research 
has provided valuable insights into platform owners’ 
decisions to release first-party content and  has studied 
its consequences on the complementary market [2, 3, 4, 
13]. Nevertheless, how competition may emerge in the 
first place is still rather uncharted [14]. Various claims 
from practice-related blogs and public press articles as 
well as burgeoning academic interest in different modes 
of competitive moves conducted by platform owners 





highlight the delicacy and relevance of this phenomenon 
[2, 15, 16]. Within this area, the evolution of the 
platform core through the introduction of novel features 
has not found significant attention so far. This is 
particularly interesting because previous research 
predominantly studied selected cases of first-party 
content and has not particularly distinguished among the 
provision of first-party complements and platform core 
features [3, 4]. One challenge in studying competitive 
implications of platform core features on the 
complementary market lies in the difficulty of 
comparing platform core changes to the third-party 
complement market. Anecdotal evidence from blog 
posts suggest that complementors’ business models are 
affected by platform core features [e.g., 11]. Yet, no 
systematic approach exists that facilitates a 
comprehensive analysis of core changes. Therefore, we 
aim at addressing this gap and a) describe Apple’s 
behavior to implement changes on the iOS platform 
core, b) develop a method to measure functional 
proximity of platform core features with third-party 
apps and c) analyze the relevance and direction of core 
features vis-à-vis the complementary market. 
Against this backdrop, we conduct an exploratory 
machine-learning based case study on evolutionary 
changes of Apple iOS and analyze the functional 
overlap of changes on the platform core with the 
complements provided by third-party developers. We 
do this by proposing an approach to measure functional 
proximity of platform core features with third-party 
complements based on a combination of existing natural 
language processing (NLP) approaches. In this way, we 
aim at providing a first step towards further, in-depth 
research regarding the strategic role and implications of 
platform core changes on the complementary market. 
This paper yields three main findings. First, we 
support the notion that platform core features are an 
inherent part of a platform owner’s strategy that raises 
competitive implications. Second, the implementation 
of platform core features changes over time. Third, we 
introduce an actionable approach to compare third-party 
complements with evolutionary changes of the platform 
core on a feature level based on NLP approaches. We 
discuss the contributions of our findings for research on 
platform governance and platform competition and 
provide managerial recommendations. 
2. Background 
2.1. Platforms and platform ecosystems 
In this study, we focus on innovation platform 
ecosystems. Innovation platforms are software-based 
systems that exhibit a technological core element which 
external firms can extend by providing complementary 
products and through which the relationships and 
interactions between participants on distinct sides are 
mediated [5, 17]. Examples include mobile platforms 
such as Apple iOS or Google Android and enterprise 
software platforms such as Salesforce. Pure transaction 
platforms differ from innovation platforms in that they 
lack an extensible core-product and focus on facilitating 
matchmaking and interaction between different 
platform sides (e.g., buyers and sellers on eBay) [18]. 
Innovation platforms exhibit a modular architecture, 
dividing the system into a core and a periphery [5, 8, 
19]. The core is viewed as relatively stable and allows 
for variability in form of external innovation on the 
periphery [20]. 
A platform ecosystem is a socio-technical 
environment that embraces platform owner, 
complementors and users [5]. Platform owner and 
complementors highly depend on each other: 
Complementors rely on the platform core provided by 
the platform owner as a technological basis for their 
complement development. Innovation in the form of 
complements, however, critically determine the value of 
a platform and are therefore of utmost importance to the 
platform owner [4, 5, 21, 22]. In the case of mobile 
platforms, such complementors are usually third-party 
developers who leverage development resources 
provided by the platform owner and offer applications 
through the platform’s marketplace [4, 23]. 
2.2. Platform governance and competition 
Complementors are usually neither bound to the 
platform by formal contracts nor compensated directly 
for their development effort [24]. Instead, platform 
owner and complementors usually cultivate arm’s 
length relationships. In order to guarantee that third-
party contributions are in line with the expectations of 
the platform owner, the latter deliberately coordinates 
the actors involved in a platform ecosystem [14, 25, 26]. 
The activities of platform owners to influence behavior 
and outcomes of third-party complementors is referred 
to as platform governance [14]. Platform governance is 
a key concern for platform firms and aims at 
establishing innovation and coherence concerning 
complementors in light of behavioral uncertainty [7, 24, 
27]. In the context of platform governance, the notion of 
boundary resources has become central [24]. Platform 
owners design and employ resources at the boundary to 
facilitate an effective coordination of complementors. 
Such boundary resources represent “software tools and 
regulations that serve as the interface for the arm’s-
length relationship between the platform owner and the 
application developer” [24:174]. Boundary resources 
may be a viable means to manage the existing tension of 
control and autonomy that platform owners as 
Page 6680
coordinating entity are confronted with [7]: On the one 
hand, boundary resources may secure a platform by 
regulating (resource) openness and managing privacy 
[24, 28]. On the other side, boundary resources may 
highlight development opportunities and stimulate 
complementary innovation (i.e., resourcing) [24]. 
A purposeful design and governance of a platform 
gives rise to environmental dynamics and platform 
competition that influence the platform’s further 
development [3, 5, 21]. The investigation of competition 
is of high interest among scholars in the context of 
platform governance [e.g., 3, 4, 29]. The ways in which 
competition takes place are multifaceted. For instance, 
competition exists between platform-based markets as 
platforms coexist and compete on functionality or 
pricing [1]. What is more, competition exists within a 
platform, where it occurs between platform participants. 
For example, an app market, which is often part of 
mobile platforms, is a highly competitive environment 
where apps compete for user downloads [30]. 
Complementors are not only competing with each other, 
they also face a risk of experiencing competition with a 
platform owner: Platform owners frequently decide to 
enter complementary markets with own competing 
solutions [21]. Extant work on platform governance 
increasingly focuses on understanding the phenomenon 
of such market entries by platform owners [3, 4]. 
Related research has predominantly investigated 
consequences of this occurrence on the complementary 
market and also started to investigate patterns and infer 
motivations (see [14] and [31] for extensive reviews). In 
the case of mobile apps, we find several examples of 
platform owner entry. Apple, for example, releases first-
party apps that directly compete with those provided by 
external complementors [3, 4]. Besides, Apple releases 
novel features that potentially overlap with features of 
complements [2, 15]. Such platform design decisions 
may increase governance costs in that they require 
complements to renew and update existing knowledge 
regarding complement development [32]. 
In the context of this paper, we focus on the practice 
of platform owners to constantly make changes to the 
platform core, thereby promoting platform evolution. In 
particular, we investigate platform core features, which 
refer to software features that are an integral part of the 
platform core and exceed maintenance and error 
handling. A unique characteristic compared to (first-
party) apps is that they form a part of the platform core; 
thus, they are directly shipped with it via global system 
updates and are non-removable. Platform core features 
are further directly accessible by platform users (e.g., 
while using an app), via specific gestures or hardware 
buttons (e.g., the home button on an Apple iPhone). 
3. Method 
3.1. Data collection 
In this study, we conduct an exploratory, machine-
learning based case study in the context of the mobile 
platform Apple iOS. We choose Apple iOS because it is 
a leading innovation platform in the mobile context, thus 
representing a typical case [33]. It exhibits a core 
product (the operating system) which is complemented 
by third-party products (apps) and, as such, exhibits 
intense dynamics between actors involved.  Besides, the 
context offers a great availability of data, which allows 
a comprehensive and longitudinal analysis of platform 
core features [33]. We follow an exploratory case-study 
design because we elaborate on a real-life phenomenon 
(i.e., the release of platform core features by a platform 
owner), for which this approach is appropriate [33]. 
The nature of our research objective requires the 
collection of data from various sources. Therefore, we 
collected data in two steps. First, we gathered data on 
the evolution of Apple iOS. Precisely, we collected data 
on changes made to the platform on the software-level 
over time. In line with previous work on software 
evolution, we relied on software release notes in this 
step [34, 35, 36, 37]. Thus, we screened publicly 
available release notes of Apple iOS. Furthermore, we 
consulted blog and newspaper articles to triangulate the 
insights on platform core changes. For the final dataset 
on change descriptions, we subsequently distinguished 
if the change is related to the “app” or “core” level. We 
developed and applied decision flowcharts based on 
ideas of Chapin et al. [38] to categorize changes as either 
related to maintenance or evolution. Maintenance-
related changes address security, performance, or 
usability issues. In contrast, evolutionary-related 
changes encompass the release of novel features, 
application programing interfaces or similar 
improvements. A set of maintenance and evolutionary 
keywords based on the works of Yu [36] and Moreno et 
al. [39] guided our coding process.  
Second, to compare platform core features with 
third-party complements, our study requires data on the 
complementary market of Apple iOS. Thus, we obtained 
monthly data on the complementary market (such as app 
name, release date, app description) of Apple iOS from 
2012 to 2020 from a leading app analytics provider. We 
exclusively focus on apps that (1) are available for 
Apple’s iPhone, (2) are listed in English language and 
(3) provide a description that exceeds 200 characters. 
Furthermore, we exclude apps from the category 
“Games”. This is due to the fact that this category is not 
compatible with the nature of platform core features. 
Besides, none of the studied changes touches this 
category throughout the observation period. 
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3.2. Data analysis and measurement approach 
To measure the functional proximity of 
evolutionary changes of the platform core and features 
of third-party complements, we designed a 
measurement method leveraging six NLP approaches. 
The designed measurement method is based on a textual 
comparison of app descriptions of complements and the 
descriptions of platform core features. This is due to the 
assumption that complementors record the purpose and 
at least the most essential features of their applications 
offered on the app market in their respective 
descriptions [40]. 
The development of the measurement method was 
informed by a set of NLP techniques and methods from 
extant literature and is based on the following 
requirements related to textual comparisons: The 
proposed method is supposed to (1) determine the 
similarity of two texts with a resulting numerical value, 
(2) focus on semantic relations between texts, (3) be 
invariant to the length and structure of provided texts 
and (4) be unsupervised, with no need for labeled data.  
Based on these requirements, three different NLP 
techniques and methods were selected: Word 
embeddings with Soft Cosine Similarity evaluation, the 
Universal Sentence Encoder and a simple keyword 
search. 
The first method for identifying affected third-party 
apps uses Soft Cosine Similarity based on applying 
word embeddings and a subsequent calculation of the 
similarity of the resulting vector representations. Word 
embeddings are word representations as multi-
dimensional vectors where similar words tend to have 
similar representation vectors [41]. The comparison of 
platform core features and app descriptions relies on the 
semantic similarity of textual descriptions based on Soft 
Cosine Similarity. While the more simple Cosine 
Similarity measure for determining the similarity of two 
descriptions is limited due to the loss of information by 
using averaged word vectors for the whole document 
[42], Soft Cosine Similarity also considers the similarity 
of individual words (features) [43]. We used pre-trained 
word embedding models based on the GloVe approach 
developed by Pennington et al. [44] in three variants for 
our approach. The GloVe model is a successor of the 
work by Mikolov et al. [41] with improved performance 
on word similarity tasks [44]. We implemented the first 
two variants on a pre-trained GloVe word vector model 
based on Wikipedia and Twitter, respectively, with no 
stemming (i.e., reducing words to their root form) as 
preprocessing steps and added a Twitter-based GloVe 
model with stemming as a third variant. 
Our second method uses the Universal Sentence 
Encoder incorporating models based on transformer 
learning to construct sentence embeddings [45]. Given 
a string in English, the models are able to deliver an 
embedded vector representation for a whole document 
that is fixed in length independently from the length of 
the input string [45]. This feature allows us to make a 
textual comparison by using the models to construct an 
embedded vector representation of the platform core 
features and app descriptions, respectively.  
We implemented two variants of the Universal 
Sentence Encoder, which differ in the use of the pre-
trained models. The first variant (“v1”) is based on the 
first published version of the Universal Sentence 
Encoder model. This model is based on a deep 
averaging network (DAN), which produces the 
embeddings for the input texts based on the average of 
the respective word and bi-gram embeddings [45]. The 
second variant (“v2”) uses the fourth version of the deep 
averaging network encoder proposed by the Universal 
Sentence Encoder project team [45].  
Additionally, we implemented a simple keyword 
search as a third method to take advantage of an intuitive 
concept and support the other two methods, ending up 
in total with six implemented variants. We introduce a 
scoring system to summarize the identification results of 
all the variants. In detail, the number of occurrences of 
each app is summed over all measurement approaches. 
The resulting sum is the individual score per app. 
First, the six implemented approaches were 
provided with the appropriate input, such as the 
keywords or app descriptions and the descriptions of the 
platform core features. Apart from the keyword 
approach, where a simple match was sufficient, we set 
the threshold for the probability value for the similarity 
greater than 0.5 to identify an affected app. Since we 
conducted an unsupervised learning approach 
comparable with a binary classification (1 if an app is 
affected by a core feature, and 0 otherwise) we followed 
the default threshold of 0.5 for binary classification.  
Afterwards, we manually reviewed a set of 22,776 
identified third-party applications to check if a certain 
feature is indeed provided by the respective app. The 
applications in this set were detected by at least three of 
the implemented approaches (see scoring system). 
Table 1 provides a summary of the identification results 
for the individually implemented approaches, including 
the respective precision benchmark. The precision 
indicates the fraction of truly identified applications 
within the 22,776 retrieved ones by the implemented 
approaches. Since we worked with unsupervised 
approaches on a large-scale dataset, we were only able 
to provide the precision (False Positive Rate) of the 
approaches but not the recall (True Positive Rate). 
In terms of precision, the keyword search and the 
second version of the Universal Sentence Encoder are 
found to be the most effective approaches. However, 
compared to the other techniques, these two approaches 
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identified a much smaller number of apps whose 
features indeed overlap with the identified platform core 
features. The total number of identified apps shows that 
the first version of the Universal Sentence Encoder and 
the approach based on Soft Cosine Similarity with 
stemming preprocessing are relatively insensitive. 
 
Table 1. Identification results for each implemented 























343,384  5,763  0.017  
Universal Sentence 
Encoder - v1  
335,789  4,147  0.012  
Universal Sentence 
Encoder - v2  
10,904  1,043  0.087  
 
This suggests that for the task of identifying 
affected apps among descriptions, these two approaches 
have rather generated generally higher values for the 
similarity. Thus, the set of returned apps is much larger, 
but only a similar number of relevant apps are included 
compared to the other approaches. Due to the high 
number of false positives, these two approaches are the 
least precise, shown by the calculated precision value. 
In summary, none of the implemented NLP approaches 
delivers satisfactory results as a standalone solution 
based on data input. Nevertheless, the total number of 
identified third-party apps that overlap with features of 
the platform core is promising. 
By applying a scoring system, we combined the 
results of the individual approaches: An identified third-
party app received a score between 0 and 6, depending 
on how many of the six approaches identified it to be 
affected by platform core features. In other words, our 
approach builds a logical conjunction of the outputs of 
the six isolated approaches. We came up with the idea 
of a similarity scoring system by comparing the 
precision metrics of a combined approach in contrast to 
the single approaches (Table 1). The precision metrics 
are increasing significantly when combining the output 
of multiple approaches, enhancing the overall reliability 
of our identification results.  
 
Table 2. Identification results for the combination 










Apps with score  
= 3  15,458 2,225 0,144 
Apps with score  
= 4 5,627 2,630  0.467  
Apps with score  
= 5 1,467 1,137  0.775  
Apps with score  
= 6 224 211  0.942  
Apps with 
score >= 3  22,776 6,203  0.272 
 
Based on the scoring results, we performed an 
additional evaluation. A precision of 0.272 was 
achieved for apps with a score of at least 3, improving 
the overall precision in comparison to the stand-alone 
approaches. Focusing on higher scores even increased 
the precision up to 0.942 (score = 6). Further details are 
illustrated in Table 2. These results show that once an 
app has been identified as affected by multiple of the 
implemented approaches based on its textual 
description, it is much more likely that the app actually 
shares the identified features with the platform core. 
4. Results 
4.1. Evidence on platform evolution of Apple 
iOS 
Apple’s proprietary mobile operating system was 
released in 2007, together with the first generation of the 
mobile device iPhone. Since then, Apple has 
continuously released and documented updates to iOS. 
In this study, we cover the time period from June 2007 
to April 2020 resulting in 140 released iOS versions 
clustered within 13 major versions. Apple uses integer 
values to refer to major version updates (e.g., iOS 11.0), 
and cascaded fractional digits values to refer to minor 
platform changes. Our data shows that the average time 
span between version releases alternates strongly 
throughout the observed period, with up to an average 
of 80 days between two releases in one year. However, 
from 2013 on, these average values settle at less than 40 
days. Thus, Apple increased the number of annual 
releases and reduced the intervals between versions 
since 2013.  
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Figure 1. Number of changes to iOS per major 
version, categorized among change level and type 
The analysis of release notes identified 1,641 
changes that were documented for the 140 versions in 
the period under review. The changes can be allocated 
to a total of 91 distinct areas of iOS (core features and 
first-party apps). We categorized those changes among 
the app and core level and accounted for their change 
type (maintenance or evolutionary). Our results 
emphasize that most of the releases focus on 
maintenance changes, while the minority of changes 
involve novel features. This observed proportion has 
increased in recent years. Releases of iOS are found to 
be successive to each other in most cases. Apart from 
some overlaps after a new version release, previous 
major versions usually do not receive further updates 
after a new major version has been introduced. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the majority of changes 
introduced via major versions target the app level. While 
iOS evolves with each major release on both the core 
and app level, we observe a focus on the introduction 
and maintenance of first-party apps that are shipped 
with iOS. Platform core features and first-party apps are 
primarily introduced via major version releases. In 
contrast, minor version number changes predominantly 
focused on maintenance changes. This update behavior 
was observed throughout the entire observation period. 
Therefore, our analysis shows that the evolution of the 
iOS platform core reveals recognizable patterns and 
suggests a certain predictability regarding the release 
time of platform core changes. 
Over the entire study period from 2007 to 2020, we 
observed the release of 113 relevant core features on 
iOS based on an analysis of 354 evolutionary core-level 
iOS changes. 43 of these features were assigned a high 
potential impact on third-party complements. The 
potential impact was considered to be medium for 16 
features and low for 54 features. These core features 
were assigned to 18 different feature areas. Most of the 
features were traced back to the areas “Siri”, “iCloud”, 
“Spotlight”, “Accessibility”, “General” and 
“Keyboard”. Besides, some features led to the 
introduction of novel feature areas such as “Printing”, 
“Control Center”, “Parental Controls”, or “Screenshot” 
at the time of their release. 
Our analysis further shows that Apple introduced 
several novel platform core features to iOS every year. 
Figure 2 illustrates the number of released platform core 
features and their assumed impact on the 
complementary market. While the number of released 
platform core features does not vary considerably across 
years, the number of features that exhibit a high impact 
on the app market is rising. This finding is remarkable 
in light of the finding that the overall number of changes 
has decreased in recent years. The number of platform 
core features released per year seems to be relatively 




Figure 2. Released iOS platform core software 
features per year 
The number of platform core feature releases in the 
early years of the iOS platform (i.e., before 2012) is 
higher compared to recent years (i.e., after 2015), with 
a higher percentage of features coded as exhibiting a 
potentially high impact on third-party complements. We 
further find that most platform core features (46 in 
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particular), are introduced within the first release of a 
major version update (e.g., iOS 12.0). Minor version 
updates, in contrast, predominantly convey a small 
number of new features over the last updates.  
4.2. Platform core features vis-à-vis the third-
party complement market 
In this section, we present the results of applying 
the measurement method developed in the context of 
this study. In particular, we report on the relevance and 
direction of platform core features released by Apple 
vis-à-vis the third-party complement market. The 
developed measurement method and an additional 
manual evaluation (see chapter 3) yielded a total of 
6,203 affected third-party complements for 29 highly 
relevant platform core features released between 2012 
and 2020 (14 have been released before 2012). Most 
identified apps were affected by the platform core 
features “Internet radio via Siri” (2,198 identified 
affected third-party apps), “Flight status information via 
Siri” (901), “Credentials and account info manager” 
(372), “Emergency handling” (345) and “Flashlight” 
(282). We further find that the number of affected apps 
nearly doubled in the three most recent years of the 
observed time period. This is interesting given that the 
number of introduced relevant platform core features 
decreased in more recent years, yet this analysis does 
not control for the total number of apps and number of 
apps per category. The categories “Music”, 
“Entertainment” and “Utilities” show the highest 
numbers of apps affected by platform core features. 
Nevertheless, the number of platform core features 
assignable to app categories differs slightly from this 
observation. The categories most platform core features 
are assigned to are “Productivity”, “Utilities”, 
“Entertainment” and “Lifestyle”. The mentioned 
categories show similarities to more than 20 platform 
core features each. 
Besides, we assess the functional overlap of third-
party complements with platform core features on the 
publisher-level. The identified set of third-party 
complements are found to be distributed among 3,726 
publishers. Over 616 publishers operated at least one 
app that shows a functional overlap with platform core 
features. 80 publishers are identified to have operated 
more than two affected apps. These affected publishers 
mainly operate apps in the categories “Productivity”, 
“Utilities” and “News”. In summary, the majority of the 
identified app publishers have been affected once by 
novel platform core features to iOS. Few publishers 
have been identified to operate several hundred affected 
apps, yet exhibit a functional overlap with only a single 
platform core feature. A closer analysis revealed that the 
apps of these publishers are remarkably similar 
regarding their provided features and functionalities. 
Apps that allow users to check the status of a flight and 
receive flight information may serve as an example. We 
identified one publisher who operate more than 350 
such apps, each offering similar features as individually 
branded app for a specific airport. The apps of this 
particular publisher are therefore considerably similar 
for a large number of airports worldwide. We observed 
a similar phenomenon for publishers with affected apps 
by the platform core features “Internet radio via Siri” 
and “Selected Information via Spotlight”. In total, 
almost 800 of the identified third-party applications are 
operated by five publishers. 
5. Discussion 
The aim of this paper was to describe the behavior 
of platform owners to implement changes on the 
platform core and to analyze the relevance and direction 
of platform core features vis-à-vis the complementary 
market. To this end, we conducted a qualitative 
machine-learning based case study on Apple iOS. 
We highlight three main findings. First, we provide 
evidence that the release of platform core features is 
indeed an inherent part of a platform owner’s strategy. 
Our identification results show that for almost every 
relevant feature, multiple third-party apps existed on the 
App Store at the time of its release. This observation 
indicates an elevated supply of apps for the specific 
features and suggests that complementors have served 
the market prior to the feature releases.  
Second, we find evidence that the use of platform 
core features changes over time. The analysis of the 
release activity over the years since the platform’s 
inception in 2007 revealed a considerable increase in the 
number of additional minor version changes per major 
version. For example, iOS major versions 1.0 to 4.0 
comprised approximately five sub-versions (e.g., 4.1.; 
4.2.), whereas later major versions encompass up to 15 
such sub-versions. Our results also suggest that the 
number of affected apps nearly doubled in the last three 
years of the observed time period. This is particularly 
interesting in light of the observation that the number of 
relevant platform core features decreased in recent 
years. Most importantly, we identify a higher number of 
platform core features in the platform’s first years 
compared to later years. 
Third, we provide an actionable approach to 
compare third-party complements with evolutionary 
changes of the platform core on a feature level based on 
the computation of textual similarity. We implement 
and evaluate different NLP approaches based on the 
work and ideas of Cer et al. [45], Mikolov et al. [41], 
Pennington et al. [44] and Sidorov et al. [43] as well as 
a supplementary keyword search. In particular, we 
Page 6685
propose a scoring approach that combines various 
existing and proven techniques. The implementation of 
this combination yields a significant increase with 
regards to precision values. Besides providing a means 
to compare platform core features with the 
complementary market, the measurement approach 
further enables us to assign platform core features to app 
categories, facilitating a category-centric analysis of 
evolutionary changes of a platform. 
We want to highlight the following three 
contributions to research on platform governance and 
competition in platform ecosystems. First, we contribute 
to extant work on platform governance in general by 
providing evidence that supports the reality of platform 
core features as relevant strategic move by platform 
owners. Following extant research, consequences of this 
phenomenon may be contingent on the respective 
degree of interface openness and align with the two 
processes “securing” and “resourcing” of the boundary 
resources model [24, 46]. A commoditization of features 
that are solely provided to be used by customers might 
refer to a closing strategy of the platform owner in that 
it secures the platform from undesired contributions. In 
contrast, platform core features may also represent 
novel interfaces that third parties use and connect 
complements to. Under these circumstances, the release 
of platform core features might represent an act of 
resourcing by evolving the interfaces offered for 
complement development [47]. In acknowledging a 
purposeful design and release of functional core 
changes, our findings challenge the established core-
periphery argument that regards the platform core as 
relatively stable [5, 8]. Our study shows that platform 
core features indeed compete with complements and 
suggests that innovation also takes place on the platform 
core [20, 48]. Hence, our findings support the notion of 
platforms as evolving organizations [20]. Future 
research is required to understand under which 
conditions the platform core should remain stable and 
when variability is beneficial. 
Second, we contribute to extant work on platform 
governance that has investigated the phenomenon of 
platform owner entry by studying how competition 
emerges between platform owner and complementors 
[2, 3, 4]. We conduct a systematic analysis of the 
relevance and functional overlap of platform core 
features with existing third-party complementors. Our 
findings support recent work and suggest that functional 
updates to the platform core represent a strategic option 
of platform owners to induce competition [2, 15]. 
The measurement approach may help future 
research in further analyzing idiosyncrasies of different 
modes of platform owner entry. In this way, we 
contribute to work that studied platform core features [2, 
15], complement acquisitions [48], and the release of 
first-party apps [4, 49], highlighting the potential 
influence and relevance of single features introduced by 
extending the underlying software system in the analysis 
of competition within platform ecosystems. 
It is yet to investigate how the threat of facing 
competition with a platform owner via platform core 
features compares with the threat posed by first-party 
apps and how core changes influence the 
complementary market. A promising avenue for future 
research may be to build on this observation and analyze 
the particular competitive effect of platform core 
features on the complementary market. The developed 
measurement approach can support research regarding 
how the threat of facing platform core features 
materializes in other platform ecosystems. 
Third, we highlight differences in the release 
behavior of platform owners that may point to latent 
patterns of active participation of platform owners in the 
complementary market [12, 17]. On the one hand, we 
emphasize the importance of analyzing platform core 
features over time for this might inform the discussion 
on motivations of platform owners to enter 
complementary markets. On the other hand, the increase 
in affected apps in recent years may also be interpreted 
as an indication of the popularity of the respective 
platform core feature. Bender et al. [15] deliver a 
supportive finding: According to their interviews with 
app developers, popular complements are more likely to 
be integrated into the platform core. 
These circumstances call for further investigation 
of how the platforms' release behavior affects user 
experience and if such behavior has any appreciable 
effects on complementors. Extant work has highlighted 
the relevance of developer conferences for platform 
governance [50]. Future work may explore their role in 
addressing potential negative consequences caused by 
platform core features, given that they are frequently 
preannounced during such events. 
Future work may also elaborate on the influence of 
feature breadth of complements on the effect of 
competitive first-party content. In doing so, future work 
could emphasize the perspective of complementors and 
customers more intensively and inform work on 
complementor responses and coping strategies to 
overcome and survive competitive conflicts with a 
platform owner [e.g., 12, 15, 51]. 
These findings have the following managerial 
implications. On the one hand, the release patterns and 
update behavior observed introduce a somehow 
predictable course regarding the introduction of 
platform core features. While the actual moves and their 
purposes remain difficult to predict, the timing of such 
moves in relation to the platform core can be narrowed 
down to the release cycles. Complementors on mobile 
platforms should therefore pay special attention to the 
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annual major releases, since it is mainly through these 
releases that novel platform core features are 
introduced. Therefore, complementors are well advised 
to prepare for the yearly occurring major versions, 
which usually introduce multiple novel features to the 
platform core. As those introductions may contain 
competitive moves that potentially jeopardize the 
complementors’ business model, complementors should 
actively monitor the announced changes and adjust their 
development strategy accordingly. What is more, 
complementors should also be alert to evolutionary 
changes implemented on competing platforms. On the 
other hand, platform core features are often related to 
the categories “utility” and “productivity”. Therefore, 
third-party applications and related complementors 
from these categories are particularly likely to be 
confronted with a potential market entry of the platform 
owner. Besides, platform core features affect a vast 
number of third-party apps in entertainment, music and 
travel categories, whereby these features are less 
category-specific and affect several categories 
simultaneously. This urges complementors to strongly 
monitor adjacent categories with regards to potential 
core feature overlaps. 
6. Conclusion 
Platform ecosystems are becoming increasingly 
important as they have become omnipresent nowadays. 
This study has provided evidence that the evolution of a 
platform is intertwined with competition in that changes 
of a platform core may introduce features that inherently 
overlap with features provided by third-party 
complementors. In particular, we analyze changes 
conducted by Apple on its mobile platform iOS and 
identified 29 potentially competing platform core 
features that are published between 2012 and 2020. The 
proposed measurement approach identifies various 
third-party apps that are directly related to platform core 
features. 
The growing amount of power and influence of 
platform owners and the inherent interdependencies 
among ecosystem participants clearly emphasize the 
necessity of an ongoing discourse on the proper 
governance of platform ecosystems, as well as 
competitive implications of governance decisions. By 
focusing on the integration of features into the platform 
core as potentially inducing competition with 
complementors as a particularly subtle but effective 
strategic move, we aim to provide a fruitful basis for 
subsequent discussions on the phenomenon of 
competition within research on platform governance. 
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